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Ptolemaic - Egyptian Collaboration 
and the Weak state problem
Alan Clingan (University of Maryland -- College 
Park)
 Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE, 
appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After 
millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt’s leader was a 
foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander’s 
empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305 
BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the 
Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states. 
The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had 
to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian 
bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander 
but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and 
threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt 
this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty 
had to exercise control through all the levels of administration 
down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the 
mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the 
Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises 
were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them, 
but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies’ grasp undid their 
strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first 
three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to 
respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic 
administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power 
by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level 
administrators.
PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
Penn History Review     108 
Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration
 Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized 
the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general 
consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient 
rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of 
their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying 
this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing 
on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,] 
Succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they 
failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore, 
a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became 
inevitable.”1 She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty 
into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad 
Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warrior-
pharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous 
sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and 
older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single 
classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy 
IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues, 
and senseless and continual drunkenness.”2 These descriptors 
thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of 
individuals.
 This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity, 
and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule. 
It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayed their welcome. 
Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power. 
Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The 
Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt 
to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions 
were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The 
rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state. 
These claims function, however, only under the assumption that 
the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion, 
yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence 
most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after 
the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle 
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was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek 
troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the 
battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt. 
As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against 
Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time, 
but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves 
upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed 
to obey orders.”3 The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed, 
dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia 
bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in 
2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that 
it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the 
post-Raphia rebellion].”4 These interpretations rely on the belief 
that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed, 
took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet 
these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power 
which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.
 Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the 
Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the 
Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions 
that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces 
outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by 
a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty 
in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of 
Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because 
the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the 
Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when 
evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state 
was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed 
actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable 
to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident 
that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with 
the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside 
their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak 
because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove 
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this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions 
between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians. 
PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION
 The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic 
administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the 
administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency 
over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency 
against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic 
state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning 
as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the 
population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers 
predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement 
officers as having Egyptian names.5 These local officers themselves 
relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order 
to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the 
local officer would call upon the local populace to help track 
down those evading justice and stolen property.6 This utilization 
of the local population as the arm of the law under official 
sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later 
legal traditions would call a Posse comitatus, or in more common 
parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call 
upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable 
to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local 
level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions 
among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather 
than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide 
range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted 
investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their 
law enforcement duties.7 This broad purview left a substantial 
portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could 
have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law 
upon local administrators’ request, as if the Egyptians refused to 
assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce 
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the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population 
worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies. 
Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently 
oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration 
between the two parties.
 The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure, 
functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the 
average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the 
Ptolemies carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to 
retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and 
legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations 
even in 126 BCE.8 Even the language used at the lowest levels 
remained Egyptian.9 In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was 
an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal 
appeal.10 Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be 
appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment 
were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh 
himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition.11 This 
continued and expanded under the Ptolemies. Voluminous letters 
and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemies, 
the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual 
thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low 
administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt 
relief.12 Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of 
command.13 A tax collector’s Greek assistant received petitions 
for the release of a criminal.14 Examples such as these abound 
in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach 
the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemies tried to 
display themselves as just. Despite Polybius’s claim that Ptolemy 
IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his 
emphasis on justice and mercy commendable.15 This concept that 
the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially 
after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to 
the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemies. 
 Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards 
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the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of 
collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied 
on land and routed the payments though the temples up through 
the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was 
kept intact by the Ptolemies.16 Tax breaks were granted to soldiers 
to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency 
would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of 
taxes.17 The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were 
exempt from taxes.18 Broad swaths of the population faced 
lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.19 Information 
about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect, 
did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy, 
but from the lower levels of administration upwards.20 Given 
the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many 
foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military 
by promises of substantial pay.21 The ability of the Ptolemies to 
grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in 
perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes 
played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies 
depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic 
income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on world-
conquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander’s empire 
as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was 
often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule. 
Ptolemy I’s conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the 
plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not 
translate his success in battle into further conquests.22 Plundering 
and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After 
all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be 
effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered 
in the Siege of Sardis.23 Through plunder, the Ptolemies were 
able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while 
maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at 
the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.24 Perhaps the 
Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at 
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all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if 
they wanted to conquer.25
 The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine, 
had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance 
of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear 
sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple’s 
bureaucracy.26 This they did through actions, performed in 
rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.27 The temple 
priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state, 
also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.28 Around 15% of 
Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30% of those 
directly held priestly offices.29 An unknown number of Ptolemaic 
Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but 
did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined 
through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of 
these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.30 Given 
the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the 
temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottom-
up fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting 
of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic 
pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new 
temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic 
dynasty.31 Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt 
would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy 
to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform 
the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks 
of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of 
their occupation.
Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian 
pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident 
is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian sym-
bolism and traditions.
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 Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only 
maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active 
movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The 
creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a 
combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other 
attributes more often associated with Greek divinities.32 Many 
attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes 
of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god 
and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also 
merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing 
god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the 
Egyptians and Greeks.33 Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond 
the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding 
Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians.34 Among 
the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role 
as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity 
in the Greek and later Roman worlds.35 This opened up new 
temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link 
between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite 
some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed 
new temples for him.36 Through these temples both Greeks and 
Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity 
into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of 
the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single 
identity. 
 Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted 
to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language 
along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the 
language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic 
society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper 
reaches of the bureaucracy.37 The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves 
were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only 
one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with 
Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian.38 The lack of effort on 
part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly 
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constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But 
while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach 
up.39 Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic 
state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt 
Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in 
Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later 
generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge 
of Greek was limited.40 Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that 
example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity.41 This adoption 
of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the 
exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy, 
where Greek names predominate.42 While it certainly may be true 
that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained 
predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by 
adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have 
given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil 
servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist 
sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians. 
 The Ptolemies actively used their founder’s connection 
with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the 
successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of 
Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting 
the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies. 
The capture of Alexander’s body by Ptolemy I and its burial in 
Alexandria can be seen in this light.43 If the Egyptians could be 
made to feel as if they were part of Alexander’s empire, then the 
threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty 
continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced. 
Even Ptolemy I’s original claim only to the title of satrap aligns 
with this reconfiguration of history.44 Egypt was portrayed as the 
Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the 
successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as 
an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostris, a warrior 
pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostris myth 
was “used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after] 
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a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to 
buttress their sagging national self-confidence and…national 
identity.”45 The myth is a reversal of Alexander’s conquests and 
by extension the Ptolemies’, but it emphasizes Egypt as the 
conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander’s empire, or what 
remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history 
of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and 
Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia.46 This 
repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled 
nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and 
Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then 
the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign. 
By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their 
purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.
 The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences 
between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to 
assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian 
subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian 
and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic 
Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many 
Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt.47 Seeing 
the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek 
racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated 
a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the 
settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives 
in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by 
the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the 
Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it 
seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial 
divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians.48 Drawing racial 
distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have 
worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative 
state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered 
from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the 
performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian 
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pharaoh continued.49 If the Ptolemies had actively racialized 
the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon 
the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen. 
Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by 
Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves 
this conundrum. 
EXPLAINING THE FALL
 Despite all these attempts and quite substantial 
collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian 
uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious 
rebellions, this slowly changed.50 By the time of Ptolemy IV, who 
reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke 
out.51 These rebellions became more common and more difficult to 
suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on.52 But these uprisings were 
closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic 
policies.53 When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile 
flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the 
severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions 
around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned 
Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts.54 Even the 
uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of 
A coin of the unlucky Ptolemy IV, a ruler who faced the 
first of many major uprisings which the Ptolemaic state 
were unable to suppress.
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Raphia  coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow 
of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations.55 While the 
role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should 
not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with 
environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt 
of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with 
Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity.56 These and other 
examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes 
are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused 
ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt. 
The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was 
littered with similar examples.57 Yet since these uprisings were a 
continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability 
of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is 
notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.
 The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the 
native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to 
reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those 
Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting 
the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the 
Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by 
environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been 
needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations 
brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized. 
Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have 
significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely 
on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic 
dynasty’s ability to exert control when uprisings occurred. 
Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create 
a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or 
create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to 
factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the 
latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a 
weak state they lost their rule.




 The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with 
the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a 
broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected 
by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed 
Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an 
average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to 
skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers. 
Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in 
their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent, 
but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the 
ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples, 
possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism 
all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the 
features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as 
substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a 
decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the 
Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies 
did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not 
control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were 
common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized 
and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made 
it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and 
decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking 
uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings 
anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state 
structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in 
normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness 
in their reign.
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